Divine Command Theory of Morality
(or Theological Voluntarism)
vs.
If statement (b) is true, then "forbidden by God" is the essence of wrongness. This means that all there is to something's being wrong that it is forbidden by God. Hence, if God were to, e.g., forbid brushing one's hair, then brushing one's hair would be wrong. That is to say, it would be morally wrong to brush one's hair. Furthermore, if God were to, e.g., not forbid murder, then murder would not be wrong. That is to say, murder would be morally permissible.
If statement (b) is true, then 'commanded by God' is the essence of rightness. This means that all there is to something's being right that it is commanded by God. Hence, if God were to command that one, e.g., commit murder, then committing murder would be right. That is to say, it would be morally obligatory to commit murder.
(It might be argued here that 'murder' simply means '[morally] wrongful killing', and hence, that it would be logically impossible for it to be morally obligatory to commit morally wrongful killing. But if 'murder' means at least the killing of an innocent, non-aggressing, non-threat-shielding, person without her/his consent, then surely it is not logically impossible for this to be morally obligatory. Arguably, the story of God commanding Abraham to kill his son Isaac in the Old Testament is a case of God commanding murder; and if the Divine Command theory were true, then this act, if it is an act of murder, is a morally obligatory murder.)
(or Theological Voluntarism)
(a) Murder is forbidden by God because it is wrong
vs.
(b) Murder is wrong because it is forbidden by God
If statement (b) is true, then "forbidden by God" is the essence of wrongness. This means that all there is to something's being wrong that it is forbidden by God. Hence, if God were to, e.g., forbid brushing one's hair, then brushing one's hair would be wrong. That is to say, it would be morally wrong to brush one's hair. Furthermore, if God were to, e.g., not forbid murder, then murder would not be wrong. That is to say, murder would be morally permissible.
If statement (b) is true, then 'commanded by God' is the essence of rightness. This means that all there is to something's being right that it is commanded by God. Hence, if God were to command that one, e.g., commit murder, then committing murder would be right. That is to say, it would be morally obligatory to commit murder.
(It might be argued here that 'murder' simply means '[morally] wrongful killing', and hence, that it would be logically impossible for it to be morally obligatory to commit morally wrongful killing. But if 'murder' means at least the killing of an innocent, non-aggressing, non-threat-shielding, person without her/his consent, then surely it is not logically impossible for this to be morally obligatory. Arguably, the story of God commanding Abraham to kill his son Isaac in the Old Testament is a case of God commanding murder; and if the Divine Command theory were true, then this act, if it is an act of murder, is a morally obligatory murder.)
If the answers is incorrect or not given, you can answer the above question in the comment box. If the answers is incorrect or not given, you can answer the above question in the comment box.